DOJ Updates White-Collar Enforcement Priorities

DOJ Updates White-Collar Crime Enforcement Priorities 

On May 12, 2025, the Criminal Division of the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) announced its white-collar enforcement priorities in a series of new memoranda and policies and a speech by Matthew R. Galeotti, the Acting Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Criminal Division.

During his speech, Galeotti stated that the DOJ “is turning a new page on white-collar and corporate enforcement” and putting an end to “excessive enforcement and unfocused corporate investigations that stymie innovation, limit prosperity and reduce efficiency.” Instead, the Criminal Division intends to focus on “the most egregious white-collar crime” and one contemporaneous DOJ memo identifies ten broad, high-impact areas of focus.  The DOJ also announced modified policies to encourage and reward voluntary corporate self-disclosures of wrongdoing, limit the frequency of the appointment and the role of monitors, and provide additional guidance concerning corporate whistleblower awards. 

The revised policies suggest that the DOJ under President Donald Trump will focus its white-collar enforcement resources on matters involving the most egregious conduct and take an even more lenient approach than in the past in matters where companies voluntarily disclose wrongdoing and cooperate in the ensuing investigation.  Although the revised policies do not provide for a full-scale overhaul of the DOJ’s white collar enforcement program, they do portend a more business-friendly approach absent aggravating circumstances.

New Areas of Emphasis in White-Collar Enforcement

The DOJ’s Memorandum on Focus, Fairness and Efficiency in the Fight Against White Collar Crime (the Memo)[1] explains the harms that white-collar crime poses to U.S. interests, but also notes that “unchecked corporate and white-collar enforcement burdens U.S. businesses and harms U.S. Interests.” For this reason, the DOJ is promulgating policies that “strike an appropriate balance between the need to effectively identify, investigate and prosecute corporate individuals’ criminal wrongdoing while minimizing unnecessary burdens on American enterprise.” 

The Memo states that the DOJ will prioritize investigations and prosecutions in the ten following areas:

1. Waste, fraud and abuse, including health care fraud and federal program and procurement fraud that harms the public fisc.
2. Trade and customs fraud, including tariff evasion;
3. Fraud perpetrated through VIEs, including securities fraud, offering fraud, elder fraud and market manipulation;
4. Fraud that victimizes US investors and markets, including ponzi schemes and servicemember fraud;
5. Threats to national security, including threats to the US financial system by its gatekeepers, such as financial institutions and insiders that commit sanctions violations or enable transactions by Cartels, TCOs, hostile nation-states and/or foreign terrorist organizations;
6. Material support by corporations to foreign terrorist organizations, including Cartels and TCOs
7. Complex money laundering and organizations involving in laundering funds involving in the manufacturing of illegal drugs
8. Violations of the Controlled Substances Act and the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, including the unlawful manufacture and distribution of chemical and equipment to create products with fentanyl and unlawful distribution of opioids;
9. Bribery and associated money laundering that impact US national interest, undermine national security, harm the competitiveness of US businesses and enrich foreign corrupt officials; and
10. Crimes involving digital assets that victimize investors and consumers and willful violations that facilitate criminal activity.

The Memo further states that the Criminal Division will prioritize efforts to identify and seize assets that are the proceeds of, or involved in, such offenses, and where authorized by law, use forfeited assets to compensate victims of these offenses.

The Memo also describes the DOJ’s new approach to “fairness” and “efficiency,” which includes modifying the DOJ’s Corporate Enforcement and Voluntary Self-Disclosure Policy (CEP) to further encourage and reward self-disclosure and cooperation, and to require “efficient investigations” and a narrowly tailored use of monitors (both described below). The Memo acknowledges the need to investigate “individual wrongdoers relentlessly to hold them accountable” but also recognizes that not all “corporate misconduct warrants federal criminal prosecution” and “civil and administrative remedies directed at corporations are often appropriate to address low-level corporate misconduct and vindicate US interests.” This is perhaps a response to criticism of the DOJ that even well-meaning companies can be burdened with expensive and lengthy investigations when they are trying to do the right thing, and tools other than criminal prosecution are available to achieve positive outcomes.

Revised CEP Encourages Corporate Self-Disclosures and Remediation

The DOJ also announced revisions to its CEP[2] that attempt to “transparently describe the benefits a company may earn through voluntarily self-disclosing misconduct.” Specifically, the revised CEP sets forth new procedures to give companies greater certainty that they can avoid criminal prosecution if four conditions are met. The CEP states that the Criminal Division “will decline to prosecute a company for criminal conduct when:

1. The company voluntarily self-discloses misconduct to the Criminal Division;
2. The company fully cooperates with the Criminal Division’s investigation;
3. The company timely and appropriately remedies the misconduct; and
4. There are no aggravating circumstances related to the misconduct and the company. 

Even if there are aggravating circumstances, prosecutors may recommend a declination based on the severity of the circumstances and the company’s cooperation and remediation; however, in either circumstance, the company will be required to disgorge profits and forfeit criminal proceeds and compensate victims of the misconduct. The CEP provides a detailed flow chart that demonstrates how a declination or a non-prosecution agreement without a monitor can be achieved. These revisions appear to offer greater and more certain incentives to investigate, self-disclose and remediate improper conduct than was the case under policies promulgated by prior Administrations. 

Amendments to Policies for Monitorships and Whistleblowers

To reinforce the DOJ’s goals of fairness and efficiency, the DOJ also clarified its policies on the Selection of Monitors[3] and its Corporate Whistleblower Awards Pilot Program[4].  

As to monitors, the new policy examines factors that may limit the risk a company poses to U.S. interests that will likely lead to a decrease in monitorships. The new policy highlights four factors that prosecutors must consider when determining whether to impose a monitorship:

1. The risk of recurrence of criminal conduct that significantly impacts US interests
2. The availability and efficacy of other independent government oversight
3. The efficacy of the compliance program and culture of compliance at the time of the resolution; and
4. The maturity of the company’s controls and its ability to independently test and update its compliance program

Together, these factors suggest that companies that, at the time of resolution, can demonstrate strong compliance programs, an unlikelihood of recidivism, and the presence of other forms of regulatory oversight are less likely to have monitors imposed than would previously have been the case.

The new monitorship policy also more explicitly directs prosecutors to weigh the costs of a monitorship on a company to ensure they are not overly burdensome and to ensure that the monitorship focuses on achieving an “appropriately tailored and effective, risk-based corporate compliance program designed to detect and prevent the recurrence of the [identified] misconduct.” 

As to whistleblowers, the DOJ revised its August 2024 policy for its pilot program to clarify the circumstances under which awards can be expected. Only individuals who provide the DOJ with “original information in writing” that “leads to criminal or civil forfeiture exceeding $1 million in net proceeds forfeited in connection with a successful prosecution, corporate criminal resolution, or civil forfeiture action related to corporate criminal conduct” may be eligible for awards.  The new policy clarifies the circumstances that meet that definition, including what constitutes original information, and certain subject areas of information that are eligible for awards, including violations involving money laundering, bribery, kickbacks, health care fraud, federal funding fraud, tariff and customs fraud, immigration fraud and offenses relating to terrorism, cartels, transnational criminal organizations and narcotics.  These criteria are designed to encourage whistleblowers in subject areas that are not covered by other federal whistleblower programs, and that are priorities of the Trump Administration.

Takeaways

The DOJ’s updated white-collar enforcement priorities and policies represent the Trump Administration’s effort to modify and leave its mark on the DOJ’s future criminal investigations and prosecutions. Substantively, they align with the Administration’s stated goal of combatting trans-national crime, cartels, immigration and trade issues. Philosophically, they reflect a belief that aggressive corporate enforcement, particularly against well-meaning companies with otherwise strong compliance culture and programs, does not necessarily advance U.S. interests. Nevertheless, the policies do not provide for or suggest that the DOJ will abandon its corporate enforcement program, as some had suggested in response to earlier policy announcements.  In that regard, the policies, at least on their face, do not deviate from the traditional recognition that fraud, corruption, and money laundering can harm U.S. interests, and that U.S. interests can be served by efficiently detecting and deterring such behavior by encouraging action, disclosure and remediation from corporate compliance departments and individuals. Thus, companies and executives would be well-advised to remain vigilant regarding compliance and understand that the DOJ’s approach to white-collar enforcement going forward likely will not depart as much from past practice as had been anticipated. 

Contact the authors for more information and insights about these policies and their anticipated effect.

[1] www.justice.gov/criminal/media/1400046/dl?inline

[2] https://www.justice.gov/criminal/media/1400031/dl?inline

[3] www.justice.gov/criminal/media/1400036/dl?inline

[4] www.justice.gov/criminal/media/1400041/dl?inline